Pages: 16

Psychological dissociation and the possibility of trauma-related disorders such as dissociative identity disorder (DID) are topics mired in controversy. This chapter introduces the two main approaches to understanding dissociation (the trauma-dissociation and socio-cognitive perspectives) and critically examines the conceptual status and theoretical assumptions found in accounts of trauma-dissociation and DID. The chapter proposes that a major problem with making sense of trauma-dissociation and DID is the lack of clarity surrounding the terms consciousness, personality, and identity, a problem compounded by the need to acknowledge cultural influences in shaping the development of self and identity. The chapter further introduces the structural theory of dissociation based on Janetian theory and contrasts this with psychodynamic approaches entailing defence. Although based on Janet’s theory, the structural theory appreciates the importance of mammalian motivational systems for explaining what people do, and as will be seen, this provides important insights into understanding both pathological and normative aspects of personality in terms of defence.

Pages: 17

Given the theoretical problems identified in the previous chapter, this chapter establishes a theoretical framework for understanding dissociation and DID to serve as a basis for judging the coherency of theories of trauma and dissociation. The chapter proposes that the concept of relation is critically important because dissociation is itself a form of relation. Psychological processes can also be seen as certain relations, and the chapter argues that clarifying the subject and object terms of the dissociative relation is important for addressing the knowers in accounts of DID. The chapter also addresses reification and circular explanation, both of which occur when the nature of relations is neglected. The chapter further discusses the distinction between description and explanation and sets out conditions for both trauma and dissociation to stand as coherent explanatory terms. Finally, a case is made that any apparent teleology as found in purposive accounts of dissociative defence needs to be recast in terms of causal antecedents.

Pages: 16

The aim of this chapter is to examine the concept of trauma in order to assess the supposed trauma-dissociation link. The chapter first traces the shift of trauma from injury to event, by discussing the origin of the conceptualisation of trauma in modern psychology and subsequent problems associated with the codification of trauma in diagnostic systems. The chapter then develops a relational view of traumatisation and outlines conceptual difficulties associated with proposing that trauma causes dissociation. Requirements for explanations of traumatisation are then considered, before addressing the view that traumatisation should be understood as a process. Addressing traumatisation as a process, the chapter identifies some minimum requirements that any theory of trauma-dissociation must satisfy to provide a foundation for later addressing the major theories of trauma-dissociation found today.

Pages: 21

This chapter provides a critical re-evaluation of the conceptual foundations underpinning contemporary theories of trauma-induced dissociation. Janet’s “passive-deficit” model and Freud’s “active-conflict” model are presented and discussed in the context of current theoretical directions addressing dissociation and DID. The chapter first discusses Janet’s contribution, noting that Janet’s account fails to adequately address how multiple minds come into existence. The Freudian basis of dissociation as a defence is then discussed. The chapter addresses how problems with the Freudian-derived position arise with explaining how defence is maintained, along with the teleological implications associated with dissociative serving an adaptive purpose. The chapter rounds off comparing and contrasting Janet’s and Freud’s views of the subconscious and unconscious respectively, arguing that despite claims to the contrary, Freud is committed to postulating multiple knowers, whereas the unconscious can clearly be found within Janet’s own writings.

Pages: 23

This chapter addresses the nature of personality, self, identity, and dissociative parts. The chapter begins by addressing the common-sense view of the self, along with problems associated with proposing a unified singular agency. These problems provide grounds for a discussion of a set of requirements that any account of personality, singular or multiple, must satisfy. The chapter then addresses objections to mental plurality before discussing the logical requirements for postulating knowers in the context of strong partitioning. The structural theory of dissociation and its contribution to understanding personality multiplicity is then examined, and a preliminary case made for substantiating the knower via the action systems identified in affective neuroscience. The chapter finishes by arguing that the structural theory provides a coherent platform for understanding dissociative parts, whereby the basic knowing subjects underlying personality are the action systems, who through competition and collaboration identify with various roles, in either any singular or multiple sense of selves.

Pages: 18

This chapter addresses the proposed developmental pathways to DID as found within Janetian deficit and psychodynamically oriented defence approaches. The chapter assesses the postulated mechanisms within the respective accounts by identifying both the relevant components and the interactions postulated to lead to the dissociative effects. The chapter provides particular focuses on the structural theory of dissociation and its proposed Janetian “deficit” basis as the primary source of structural dissociation. The chapter argues that Janetian deficit explanations are problematic, and if anything, the structural theory is logically committed to primarily explaining structural dissociation in terms of defence. However, the account of defence proposed here is not a typically psychodynamic one, and a possible mechanism for explaining how DID arises in childhood based on a revised psychodynamic position is proposed. An account is then put forward based on defence that addresses shifts in executive control and explain how one subset of the personality becomes dominant over other parts of the personality.

Pages: 5

The previous chapters assessed claims surrounding trauma-dissociation and contrasted the two major approaches to dissociation: the Janetian deficit model with the psychodynamically oriented defence approach. Although there are potential problems associated with using “trauma” as an explanatory term, traumatisation can be coherently formulated by acknowledging the complex interaction of persons and events. Whether it is possible to house multiple “personalities” was then also assessed, and the concept was found to be no more difficult than accounting for a single personality. Recognising the foundational role of action systems in personality development further substantiates how daily life and defense systems provide a basis for dissociative parts. In terms of then explaining how such multiple dissociative parts might arise, the Janetian-inspired structural theory of dissociation was then assessed. Although explanations by way of “mental energy” are problematic, a non-teleological account of defensive responses to conflict during childhood was found to emerge within the structural theory itself. It was also shown that this theory can coherently address how structural dissociation arises within the context of personality development in childhood. With respect to going forward, a dynamical systems framework is outlined here for making sense of trauma-dissociation and DID, and modelling is recommended as a possible direction for testing the theory..