Pages: 7

The introductory chapter develops the theoretical foundations of a global justice theory for children, whereby it shows that the specific characteristics of childhood (its developmental dynamics, particular vulnerability and gradual autonomy development) require an independent normative consideration. The work locates itself in the capability approach, which proves itself as particularly suitable to capture childish developmental processes and the temporal structure of justice claims. Central is thereby the distinction between a positive approach (what stands all children to?) and a negative approach (what constitutes global injustice?), whereby the first one stands in the foreground. The drastic empirical findings to child poverty, malnutrition and exploitation underline the urgency of the thematic. It is argued that children are not to be understood as passive objects of caring intervention, but as developing subjects with their own justice claims, which requires a balance between protection claims and recognition of childish agency.

Pages: 11

The philosophical engagement with childhood has gained remarkable prominence in the past decades, whereby fundamental tensions between different conceptualizations show themselves: on one side, positions that understand childhood primarily as a deficient phase of incompleteness, on the other side, approaches that emphasize its intrinsic value. The particular vulnerability of children can thereby be differentiated with Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds into inherent, situational and pathogenic forms. Central debates circle around the modification of classical justice theories for children, the role of family and state, as well as around children's rights as normative paradigm. Particular attention is given to the connection with intergenerational and historical justice, whereby children must be taken into view both as presently vulnerable persons as well as future adults. The chapter explains that the pragmatic definition of childhood serves as a starting point despite its problematic nature; however, it needs further differentiation.

Pages: 6

The methodological chapter positions the investigation in the frame of non-ideal political philosophy, which means that justice demands are developed under consideration of real conditions. The capability approach is chosen as the theoretical frame, not to defend it against alternative theories, but to demonstrate its specific suitability for the normative analysis of childhood. The integration of empirical knowledge follows a hermeneutic model that treats data not as immediate normative authorities, but as interpretation-needing phenomena. The UN Children's Rights Convention is consciously not put into the center, since philosophical foundation and political-legal codification are to be separated analytically. Particular methodological challenges arise from questions of epistemic justice (how can children's voices be included?), the balance between universalism and cultural sensitivity as well as the temporal dimension of justice for developing beings. The chapter pleads for transparency regarding methodological decisions as a commandment of intellectual honesty.

Pages: 10

The chapter argues that developing functionings and capabilities represent the appropriate currency of global justice for children, supported by four interwoven arguments. Firstly, they enable a differentiated capturing of childish developmental dynamics, without falling into static viewing ways or exaggerated development determinism. Secondly, can functionings themselves be understood development-relatedly, which is particularly suitable to capture specific vulnerabilities. Thirdly, this approach is a conceptualization of childish agency that falls neither into exaggerated paternalism nor into unreflected autonomy attribution. Fourthly, both the intrinsic value of childhood as well as its instrumental meaning are considered. The ecological model, according to Bronfenbrenner, clarifies the embedding in multiple social contexts. Conversion factors (personal, environment-related, social) prove themselves as central for the understanding of how resources become transformed into actual functionings.

Pages: 10

The development of a universal list of functionings and capabilities moves itself in the tension field between Sen's skepticism towards predefined lists and Nussbaum's plea for substantial determinations. The chapter suggests a pragmatic middle way that recognizes universal standards, without neglecting their contextual specification. As selection criteria become suggested: objectivity (understood as intersubjective comprehensibility), scientific foundation, development sensitivity, inclusion of childish perspectives and realizability. The list developed by Biggeri and colleagues with fourteen dimensions (life and health, love and care, mental well-being, etc.) illustrates the multidimensionality of children's well-being. Particular challenges arise from the operationalization of complex phenomena like respect or identity. The chapter argues that the necessary vagueness of a universal list is no deficiency, but enables productive tension between universal claims and particular realizations.

Pages: 11

The sufficiency principle becomes justified as an appropriate distribution rule of global justice for children, whereby the particular suitability results from the specific vulnerability and the potentially irreversible consequences of early deprivations. The here developed understanding is based on the fundamental insight that sufficiency for children necessarily shows a different structure than for adults. The double perspective on well-being and well-becoming proves itself as constitutive. The chapter pleads for an extended sufficiency approach that integrates temporal, relational, development-sensitive and contextual dimensions. The specification of sufficiency standards becomes understood as a process that includes different knowledge forms and cannot be reduced to a technical exercise. This shows that the sufficiency principle in the global context functions not only as an abstract distribution principle, but as a critical measure for making visible massive injustices.

Pages: 11

The determination of appropriate threshold values represents one of the most fundamental challenges, whereby the specification of abstract justice principles into concrete standards requires a multi-level process. The chapter develops a three-stage threshold model: a minimal threshold (that specifies a minimally human-dignified life), a threshold of partial justice (oriented on average middle-class children in welfare states) and an ideal threshold (under conditions of complete justice). This differentiation makes it possible to do justice both to the urgency of immediate improvements and to the vision of comprehensive justice. Central is the insight that threshold value determination can happen neither abstract-philosophically nor purely empirically, but requires continuous mediation of different knowledge forms. The model recognizes explicitly continuing inequalities also above the second threshold, argues, however, that certain differences (based on talents or familial value orientations) can be compatible with justice, as long as fundamental development chances become guaranteed.

Pages: 12

The analysis of responsibilities overcomes the traditional family-state dichotomy in favor of a differentiated model that includes different actors on different levels. According to Urie Bronfenbrenner's ecological model and Iris Marion Young's Social Connection Model, responsibilities are differentiated according to dimensions like proximity, ontology, power, causation and social context. While parents often carry primary responsibility, their power to act is frequently limited through structural injustices. Global institutions like the World Bank or transnational enterprises have, despite spatial distance, often a more grave influence on childish life chances. The temporal dimension raises questions about responsibility for historical injustices whose effects meet present generations. The chapter develops a nuanced understanding of responsibility attribution that does justice to the complexity of global interconnections, without falling into diffuse responsibility distribution. Particular attention applies to coordination mechanisms between different actors and the institutional anchoring of responsibilities.

Pages: 10

The chapter develops a conceptual model for the evaluation of protection measures based on ten systematically connected criteria: effectiveness, timing, duration, fruitfulness, corrosiveness, acceptance, reasonableness, externalities, ethical aspects and consideration of alternative approaches. These criteria stand in complex interactions whose weighting varies context-dependently. Two argumentation lines for the prioritization of childish claims are investigated: the cost-effectiveness principle shows that investments in children generate long-term, the highest returns. The fair-innings argument justifies a moral priority from the fact that children have not yet had their “fair chance” at a fulfilled life. Both arguments deliver important reasons for prioritization, without leading to an absolute precedence position. The integration of the criteria requires transparent weighings under the inclusion of empirical evidence and the perspectives of affected children. Particular challenges arise from the necessity to balance short-term emergency aid with long-term development.

Pages: 9

The concluding chapter recapitulates the central theses and directs the view to future challenges. The developed theory understands itself as an attempt to shape the tension between universal normative claims and contextual sensitivity productively. Central research desiderata encompass the concrete application in specific contexts, intersectional perspectives, methodological questions of operationalization, as well as institutional arrangements. Transformative forces of the 21st century – digitalization, climate change, demographic shifts – throw up new justice questions. The digital divide manifests itself as a central justice question, while climate change particularly hits vulnerable children in developing countries. The increasing political articulation of children and youth (exemplarily in the climate movement) challenges traditional conceptions of childish agency. The chapter pleads for continuous further development of normative frameworks under systematic inclusion of childish voices and perspectives as a condition of a philosophically coherent and practically relevant justice theory.